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From Front-runner’s ‘EUphoria’ to 
Backmarker’s ‘Pragmatic Adhocism’?




The paper aims to give a brief  but comprehensive summary of  the internal and exter-
nal dimensions of  Hungary’s EU membership and integration policy. It will outline and 
analyze the development paths and future perspectives in the fields of  European and 
foreign policy, home affairs, and economics. Whether Hungary again becomes a front-
runner in the European development process or remains a partially isolated backmarker 
hinges mainly on the direction taken in the broader European development. Neverthel-
ess the country is currently establishing an alternative political model within European 
integration. It is still not clear whether this development conforms with basic European 
standards and represents a renaissance of  the “Europe of  Nations” concept or whether 
it steps over these common rules and goes in the direction of  a political and econo-
mic “third way” model. If  one focuses on Hungarian foreign policy, the option of  a 
“Europe of  Nations” is more likely; if  one focuses on internal developments, then the 
“third way” model seems more likely. However, the country’s European policy has since 
2010 definitely turned in a very pragmatic direction compared to the “EUphoric” phase 
of  former years. Hungary accepts the fact of  a “multi-speed integration” and takes dif-
ferent pragmatic positions on very different policy issues, taking into consideration first 
and foremost an ad hoc interpretation of  national interest rather than a comprehensive 
integration strategy.
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From Front-runner’s ‘EUphoria’ to 
Backmarker’s ‘Pragmatic Adhocism’?
Hungary’s Ten Years within the European Union in a Visegrad 
Comparison
by Daniel Hegedűs
On the one hand, Hungary is a country with widely 
recognized economic reforms during the late state 
socialist era, the country that opened the Iron 
Curtain, was the first post-socialist state to join the 
Council of  Europe, and effectively paved the way 
for liberal economic and political reforms in East 
Central Europe during the 1990s, thus securing its 
position in the first enlargement rounds of  NATO 
and the EU, in 1999 and 2004 respectively. On 
the other hand, Hungary is a country with conti-
nuously decreasing competitiveness, with increasing 
external debt and economic imbalances during the 
first decade of  the new millennium. According 
to its critics, since 2010 it has become an isolated, 
enfant terrible member state of  the EU; the quality 
of  the rule of  law has been questionable, as have 
Hungary’s democratic standards. In 2012–13 the 
country was threatened with suspension of  mem-
bership rights under Article 7 TEU.1 Contrary to 
that, internal and external supporters interpret the 
reforms of  the last years as the re-establishment 
of  democratically legitimized national elites’ power 
and political space vis-à-vis alienated European 
technocracy. In their eyes, the country can be a 
possible pioneer in finding new answers to the cur-
rent crises in European integration and in forging 
new paths for the future.
This paper aims to give a brief  but comprehensive 
summary of  the internal and external dimensions 
of  Hungary’s EU membership. It will outline and 
analyze the development paths in the fields of  
European and foreign policy, home affairs, and 
economics. The author is well aware, however, that 
the question of  the last decade’s balance can hardly 
be answered in the current context. The reason 
is that Hungary now seems to be at an important 
turning point, having undergone significant chan-
ges over the last few years. This paper attempts to 
answer the question of  whether the country is now 
once again fulfilling a pioneering role – developing 
a political counter-model based on the re-establish-
ment of  the national elite’s political and economic 
sovereignty, and thus giving new impetus for the 
“Europe of  Nations” concept – or if  it is slowly 
becoming an isolated, thwarted EU member state.
The first, retrospective, part of  the paper gives 
an overview of  the main economic and political 
dynamics of  last ten years, revealing the loss of  
competitiveness and the roots and consequences 
of  the ineffective governance between 2002 and 
2010 and highlighting the contradictions of  the 
constitutional and political development after 2010 
(1.1). It also focuses on Hungary’s performance 
during the economic crisis after 2008 (1.2), and on 
the most important political controversies that have 
occurred between the European and national levels 
during recent years (1.3). The second part analyzes 
the dynamics and perspectives of  Hungary’s Euro-
pean and foreign policy (2.1), with special emphasis 
on relations with the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), fiscal integration, and the “deepening” of  
the European Union (2.2). It also puts the Hun-
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garian position on European energy and climate 
policy under the microscope (2.3), as well as its 
“uploadings” to the European political agenda (2.4), 
and finally the country’s economic and trade part-
nership, and foreign policy networks (2.5).
1. Retrospective Overview
1.1. Historical assessment of a lost decade
Bearing in mind that 2004 did not constitute a fun-
damental turning point in Hungary’s economic and 
political development, it is first necessary to take 
a deeper look at the historical situation. The most 
crucial year in contemporary Hungarian political 
history was undoubtedly 2002, which marked the 
starting point for two political and economic pro-
cesses that had a fundamental impact over the next 
eight years, and indeed to this very day. Both the 
rather low-intensity but continuous political and 
governance crisis and the increasing level of  state 
debt can be traced back to the change of  govern-
ment in 2002. This was the most emblematic star-
ting point of  a development process that has led to 
the irreconcilable polarization of  Hungarian poli-
tical life and culture. After losing the 2002 election, 
the former governing Fidesz party and its chairman 
Viktor Orbán initiated a political discourse that 
relativized the outcome of  the democratic elections 
with the famous phrase “The nation cannot be in 
opposition!” (“A Haza nem lehet ellenzékben!”),2 
expropriating the phenomenon of  “nation” for its 
exclusive use and establishing a political environ-
ment in which (excluding perhaps the last common 
project of  the country’s EU accession) any further 
compromise or cooperation between the country’s 
main political parties was impossible if  not unthin-
kable with regard to virtually any important strate-
gic issue. This stance led quite simply to a political 
cold war in Hungarian society.
On the other hand, the government lead by the 
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) introduced a 
far-reaching social welfare program that aimed to 
raise public sector wages by approximately 50 per-
cent and improve other welfare services, as it had 
promised in its election manifesto.3 Despite the 
fact that the Hungarian economy had grown on a 
balanced and sustainable basis since the economic 
reform program of  1995, it was not able to provide 
the necessary basis for such an increase in public 
spending, which led to a rise in national debt. Since 
2002, the government gross debt in GDP percen-
tage has grown by approximately 3 percent annu-
ally, from a level of  55.9 percent in 2002 to 58.6 
percent in 2003, 65.9 percent in 2006, 73 percent 
in 2008 and finally 82.2 percent in 2010.4 In the 
years 2002–08, the budget deficit varied between -5 
percent and -9 percent annually. The true situation 
of  the Hungarian economy and public finances 
was first made clear to the general public mainly 
through a leaked speech by Prime Minister Ferenc 
Gyurcsány after the second election victory of  
the socialist-liberal coalition in 2006.5 As a result 
of  the extensive social and political opposition to 
Gyurcsány, who failed to resign after his scandalous 
confession, and because the Fidesz-led opposition 
declared the government to be illegitimate and con-
sequently refused any dialogue with it, the country 
sank into a crisis of  governance. Although there 
were clear initiatives to create structural reforms 
and restore the balance of  public spending, they 
remained unsuccessful. The opposition effectively 
torpedoed the education and healthcare reforms 
with the “social referendum” of  March 2009, pres-
sing the government to suspend the system of  
individual financial contributions to healthcare and 
higher education.6 The polarized political culture 
and impotency of  government between 2002 and 
2008 meant that by the time the economic crisis 
hit, Hungary was greatly in debt both in the public 
and private sectors and had a political elite that was 
barely able to overcome petty conflicts, let alone 
agree on the strategic issues needed for effective 
crisis management.
European integration was perhaps the last common 
strategic goal of  Hungarian elites after the demo-
cratic change in Hungary. Until 2004, elites were all 
undoubtedly euphoric, though later this enthusiasm 
was mostly just from the side of  the socialist-liberal 
government. In their celebrated paper, Frank 
Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier distinguish 
three alternative models why political elites in can-
didate countries accept commitments and fulfill the 
enlargement criteria, or simply why they take part 
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in Europeanization processes.7 According to their 
models, the attitudes of  Hungarian elites if  not their 
behavior can be largely explained not by the exter-
nal incentives but by alternative social learning and 
lesson-drawn models. There was broad consent in 
Hungarian foreign policy after the creation of  the 
“three-priority model”8 in the early 1990s that there 
was no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration; it 
was the only way to escape peripheral status and to 
join the global mainstream. This was the goal that 
motivated far-reaching reforms during the 1990s to 
secure Hungary’s position in the first NATO and 
EU enlargement rounds. Even though the integra-
tion norms remained mostly unreflected, they were 
widely accepted by the elites as both necessary and 
beneficial steps in some respects, offering a solution 
for the country’s social and economic challenges. 
Moreover, after 2004 the “mission accomplished” 
feeling made the Hungarian elites complacent and 
as a consequence of  this, the country was not 
always able to exploit all the possibilities afforded 
by full EU membership status – the attitude that 
integration performance is both something positive 
per se and also a task for Hungary was never questi-
oned. This is why this paper refers to this period of  
Hungarian policy towards the European Union as 
the “EUphoric phase”.
The general Hungarian public developed negative 
attitudes toward the European Union well before 
the governing elite did. Virtually all parts of  the 
society had expected that EU membership would 
create a new economic situation with sustainable 
economic growth. When this expectation failed to 
materialize, mainly due to imbalanced public spen-
ding structure and over-taxation – that is, mainly for 
domestic reasons – confidence in EU institutions 
also started to shrink. The aggregated confidence 
rate in the three main EU institutions (European 
Parliament, Commission, and Council) peaked at 
63.6 percent in 2004, the year of  Hungarian acces-
sion, before dropping to 60 percent in 2006, 55 
percent in 2008, and to 51 percent and 53 percent 
in 2011–12 respectively, not wholly undue to the 
not always Europe-friendly messages given out by 
the government9 after 2010.10 It is, however, impor-
tant to mention that the confidence of  Hungarian 
citizens in EU institutions is still higher than the EU 
average, and higher than in many other new mem-
ber states. This phenomenon could well be explai-
ned in relation to Hungarians’ low rate of  confi-
dence in their own national institutions. The data 
gathered in answer to the standard Eurobarometer 
question of  whether EU membership is beneficial 





















Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the EU (Common 
Market) is ...?
Source: European Union, Hungary (from 10/2004 to 05/2011)
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On a strategic level, Hungarian foreign policy 
reflected the altered circumstances as early as 2008 
with the adoption of  the country’s new external 
relations strategy.12 The strategy emphasized the 
evident change of  direction in foreign policy goals 
after successful accession to NATO and the Euro-
pean Union, projects that had clearly dominated 
Hungarian foreign policy for fifteen years, and 
assigned the new main goals of  European policy as 
becoming a successful member state with effective 
interest representation, making the most of  full 
membership, and participating at an equal level 
in all dimensions of  European integration. Even 
though this re-orientation was self-evident, four 
years after the country’s accession to the EU, it 
came a bit late. Symbolically, Hungary was at that 
time at the peak of  its integration level. It joined 
the Schengen Area on December 21, 2007 and 
has theoretically still not given up its intention of  
joining the eurozone, although as a consequence 
of  the tragic state of  public finances and the Hun-
garian Central Bank’s high interest rate policy, this 
was too high an integration level to be practical.
Between 2002 and 2010 Hungary effectively managed 
accession to the European Union and the Schengen 
Area and performed a business-as-usual European 
policy as far as integration was concerned, with the 
clear intention and motivation to take part at all 
levels. On the other hand, as a consequence of  the 
government’s political incapacity, Hungary lost nearly 
a decade. Its lack of  appropriate structural reforms 
meant losing its earlier competitive advantages over 
other countries in the region. When the economic cri-
sis hit in 2008 and new parliamentary elections were 
called in 2010, the country was seriously in debt and 
politically polarized. It is, however, also important to 
emphasize an important feature of  this period: neither 
the quality of  democratic institutions and rule of  law, 
nor the shared attitudes of  the elites toward European 
integration were ever questioned.
1.2 Muddling through an almost permanent 
crisis
Even though Hungary was hit hard by the econo-
mic crisis and was endangered both by the collapse 
of  the national currency, the forint (HUF), in 2009 
and by state insolvency in every year since 2011, it 
must again be stressed that the country has been 
in a structural economic and competitiveness crisis 
and a governance efficiency crisis since 2002. Pro-
cesses mentioned in the first section led to a high 
level of  state and private debt, which has made the 
country extremely vulnerable to global economic 
turmoil and to decreasing competitiveness compa-
red with economic rivals in the region. Although 
some macroeconomic indicators, mainly budgetary 
deficit and growth rate, have improved signifi-
cantly over the last few years, other arguments 
support the thesis that Hungary’s current economic 
model is not sustainable. The relative growth rate 
remains far behind the other Visegrad countries.13 
The Hungarian Central Bank’s interest rate policy 
endangers the stability of  the forint, as demons-
trated by the destabilization of  the Euro/HUF 
exchange rate in January–March 2014. The credit 
supply of  the real economy is unsatisfactory, and 
the government is in the meantime only able to 
finance state debt by issuing bonds with relatively 
high interest rates. There is quite a bit to be said for 
the argument that Hungary is not a newly emerging 
small tiger (the “Pannonian Puma”, a fairly public 
relations parlance), but is rather still one of  the sick 
children of  the European economy.14
At the beginning of  the crisis, the Gyurcsány and 
Bajnai governments focused mainly on spending 
cuts and the securing of  the IMF-EU-IBRD loan 
package amounting to approximately 20 billion 
euros for 2008–12.15 Since 2010, the newly elected 
Orbán government has been following an econo-
mic strategy that György Matolcsy, minister of  eco-
nomic affairs in 2010–13, called “unorthodox eco-
nomic policy”. This has two main pillars. The first 
is a conservative fiscal policy that tries to reduce 
budget deficit with further spending cuts, mainly 
through the cuts in unemployment and social assis-
tance benefits. The second is the involvement of  
unorthodox income sources in the state budget. 
Economic policy measures aiming for this goal 
achieved 11 billion euros by such measures as nati-
onalizing private pension savings in 2011 – appro-
ximately 10 percent of  the annual Hungarian GDP 
– and introducing sector-specific supertaxes for tele-
communication and energy companies and banks 
between 2010 and 2013. Although some success 
was undoubtedly achieved, especially in terms of  
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reducing budgetary deficit, the consolidation must 
be judged to be unsustainable, as a consequence 
of  the temporary character of  these determining 
income sources in the fiscal stabilization. The dyna-
mics in the real economy cannot secure a stable 
foundation for it.
Many important economic decisions made by the 
Orbán government served mainly to satisfy the 
party’s voters and were not necessarily examples 
of  good economic governance. Despite the “work-
fare society” discourse in its official economic 
policy, the government increased the social, health 
and pension assurance taxes paid by employers, 
something that clearly worked against achieving 
the goal of  higher employment. And it was only 
done to create appropriate sources of  income and 
balance the introduction of  “flat tax” systems for 
employees, favoring mainly individuals with higher 
levels of  income.
The reduction of  private debt can be seen as a 
reasonable economic policy, because it could have 
contributed to reducing the country’s structural 
economic vulnerability. However, government 
programs supporting individuals with foreign cur-
rency debts were again mainly aimed at gathering 
political support and simply redistributed some 
private debt among all taxpayers and the banks 
that provided the original loans.16 Together with 
the sector-specific supertax this led to a bleeding-
out situation for financial institutions operating on 
the Hungarian market. Under these circumstances, 
important financial players like Raiffeisen and Erste 
Bank started to consider whether they should leave 
the Hungarian market in the short or mid term. 
And as a direct consequence of  the current policy, 
the credit supply of  the real economy is far from 
satisfactory. The investment rate in the economy is 
diminishing continuously from approximately 23 
percent around 2004-2005 and 22 percent in 2008 
to 18 percent in 2010 and 16 percent in 2013.17 
According to leading Hungarian economists, an 
investment rate of  around 16 percent is unfortuna-
tely no longer able to cover even the amortization 
lost in the economy. And the government’s current 
policy clearly contributes to low-level credit supply 
and the wearing out of  the Hungarian economy.
A similar phenomenon can also be observed in 
the case of  the energy companies. The supertaxes, 
combined with the financial burdens of  the price 
regulation prescribed by the state as part of  its 
“overhead cutting” (“rezsicsökkentés”) campaign, 
brought a whole industrial branch to the edge of  
profitability for political reasons. According to its 
new strategy of  welcoming investors in productive 
industrial branches but not in the service sector,18 
the government does not even try to oppose 
international energy companies leaving the mar-
ket. Taking into consideration the enthusiasm and 
willingness with which state-owned companies are 
prepared to take over their shares, one might get 
the impression that the Hungarian government is 
striving to push foreign investors out of  significant 
segments of  the economy. And it does so with 
the main aim of  regaining control over strategic 
economic sectors like energy and banking and to 
reposition politically friendly national elites in these 
sectors.
In addition, the uncertain legal environment 
has not been particularly attractive for foreign 
investors in recent years, and the only moderate 
amount of  foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
again contributed to the lack of  resources in the 
Hungarian economy. A fairly similar phenomenon 
can also be observed in the case of  state finan-
ces. The absorption level of  EU cohesion policy 
resources decreased after 201019 as a result of  the 
restructuring of  the national strategic reference 
frame and the institutional background respon-
sible for the implementation. The government 
finally opted against a further IMF loan during 
2012, which would have allowed cheaper finan-
cing of  state debt and demonstrated the country’s 
ability to acquire the appropriate resources via 
bonds from the international financial markets. 
The Orbán government simply wanted to avoid 
being shackled to an IMF loan and repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of  sovereign econo-
mic governance, which it said it was capable of  
handling. This has been of  crucial importance, 
because under the aegis of  the “unorthodox 
economic policy”, none of  the real structural 
reforms that would have been prescribed by the 
IMF, were introduced in the country. Conserva-
tive fiscal policy has indeed reduced spending 
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and thereby contributed to an unfortunately 
lower investment in human resources, but no 
fundamental reform has taken place in important 
policy structures.20
Prior to 2010, Hungary experienced no noticeable 
emigration of  the workforce.21 While it remained 
low in regional comparison, in former Hungarian 
terms it has increased significantly since then. Cur-
rently statistics show that 16 percent of  the general 
population and 56 percent of  students imagine 
their future abroad.22 There has been a slow sta-
bilization of  the employment figures, and in the 
fourth quarter of  2013 the number of  employed 
peaked again above 4 million – a figure not seen on 
the Hungarian labor market for a long time. This, 
however, still only represents an employment rate 
of  59.7 percent, clearly the lowest in the V4.23 A 
further negative sign is that the Hungarian central 
statistical office identifies the source of  this higher 
employment level as being rooted in the public 
sector, while employment in the private sector is 
stagnating or decreasing. Not only the employment 
rate but also the real Hungarian GDP growth rate 
is clearly the lowest in the V4. Positive growth 
in 2010, 2011 and 2013 (1.1 percent, 1.6 percent 
and 0.7 percent respectively) has not been able to 
counterbalance the negative growth in 2009 and 
2012 (-6.8 percent and -1.7 percent), and the Hun-
garian nominal GDP is still far from the level of  
2008 (105,535.8 million euros in 2008 compared to 
96,938.3 million euros in 2012).24
According to leading Hungarian economists, of  
the triad of  factors mainly responsible for the 
constitution of  GDP, internal demand, investment, 
and export, currently only one element, the export 
or the Hungarian trade balance, is performing 
appropriately. (It generates an annual surplus of  
approximately 7 billion euros in the trade of  goods 
and services.) An important factor in achieving this 
surplus is obviously the fact that Hungary’s traditi-
onal export markets, such as Germany and Austria, 
were not as seriously paralyzed by the economic 
crisis as other countries in the EU. As far as export 
structure is concerned, 80 percent of  Hungarian 
exports stem from multinational companies opera-
ting within Hungary.
1.3. Political controversies: the permanently 
misunderstood country
It is hard to mention some well-selected controver-
sies in Hungary’s relationship with European integ-
ration, as it has been burdened with a wide-ranging 
and deep political conflict about the direction and 
effects of  fundamental constitutional and political 
processes in the country since 2010. The alliance 
of  Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People’s 
Party (KDNP) won the 2010 elections with a 52 
percent majority. According to the mandate distri-
bution rules of  the Hungarian election system, this 
gave them a two-third majority. The new Orbán 
government, interpreted this majority as carte 
blanche to initiate a fundamental reorganization 
of  the country’s constitutional and political struc-
ture. The acceleration of  the legislation becomes 
abundantly clear when one observes that, whereas 
the average number of  acts passed by parliament 
in any one calendar year used to be 100-150, the 
number rose to 200-250 a year during the period 
2011–13. The speed with which new legislation was 
passed resulted in a decrease in legal certainty and 
rule of  law standards but was officially justified 
with the extraordinary circumstances challenging 
the government and requiring crisis management. 
If  we put the adopted laws under the microscope, 
it becomes clear that most of  them were not aimed 
at crisis management but rather at establishing and 
stabilizing the governing elite’s power position.
A detailed analysis of  the Hungarian constitutional 
processes falls outside the scope of  this paper.25 
Here it can be only focused on the issues on which 
the European Commission clearly intervened with 
the Hungarian government: the 2010 media act;26 
the independence of  the data protection authority; 
the independence of  the Hungarian Central Bank; 
the forced early retirement of  judges; and finally 
the fourth amendment of  the Hungarian Basic Law, 
which included the incorporation of  certain regu-
lations into the text of  the constitution that the 
Constitutional Court had previously judged uncon-
stitutional – thus avoiding the possibility of  further 
norm control.
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The widely discussed and criticized media act was 
adopted on December 21, 2010. Many of  the 
detailed rules of  this law can be evaluated without 
any doubt very differently in comparison with 
other European media legislation. However, accor-
ding to the OSCE Representative on Freedom 
of  the Media,27 the law resulted in an increase of  
state control over electronic media in Hungary and 
pushed media employees toward self-censorship. 
Further, the reorganization of  the Hungarian 
Media Authority opened up the possibility of  car-
rying out far-reaching staff  changes based on politi-
cal lines under the cover of  a restructuring process. 
The act was harshly criticized within the EU and it 
deeply harmed the symbolic and political appraisal 
of  the first Hungarian Council Presidency during 
the first half  of  2011.28 As a result of  the criticism, 
the Hungarian parliament amended the law on 
March 7, 2011, correcting the four points most cri-
ticized by the European Commission.29 While the 
act remained widely debated30 and was repeatedly 
placed on the agenda of  the European Parliament31 
and the Venice Commission,32 the European Com-
mission did not initiate infringement procedure in 
the case.
This was the first time that the tactics of  the Orbán 
government could be identified. These tactics are 
still used in connection with questionable legislative 
steps that still draw international criticism. Accor-
ding to this “two steps forward, one step back” 
tactic, the government adopts a law whose confor-
mity with European standards is questionable. In 
answer to its international critics, the government 
then argues that special circumstances require fast 
legislation and that similar legal regulations are 
present in other constitutional systems. In doing so, 
it ignores an important principle of  comparative 
constitutional law: that the effect of  a legal regu-
lation can vary extensively in different legal and 
political environments. And if  these arguments do 
not silence the critics, the government introduces 
some superficial and some slightly real changes to 
calm international opinion but manages to keep 
for itself  a large part of  the benefits of  the original 
legislation. Using this “trial and error” game, the 
Orbán government has been able to adapt almost 
the whole Hungarian political system to suit its 
own interests.
The fact that the EU does not have suitable tools 
at its disposal and is not ready to sanction poli-
tically a member state acting against European 
values and norms and steer it back to the common 
direction becomes evident in the case of  the new 
Hungarian Basic Law of  January 1, 2012 changing 
the former constitution. Although the political and 
legal situation in Hungary became far more serious 
than it had been at the time of  the famous “Aust-
rian case” in 2000, and the possibility of  using the 
“thermonuclear option” embedded in Article 7 of  
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) – the 
suspension of  Hungary’s membership rights – also 
emerged,33 in the end, no political sanctions were 
adopted. Instead, the European Commission did 
something for which it had clear authorization as 
“Guardian of  the Treaties”. It initiated three accele-
rated infringement procedures on January 17, 2012 
regarding the three points that most clearly violated 
EU law. These points were taken to protect the 
independence of  the Hungarian Central Bank;34 
the independence of  the judiciary (endangered 
through the forced early retirement of  judges); and 
the independence of  the data protection super-
visory authority.35 Surprisingly, the first issue was 
solved relatively quickly during July 2012, again 
with the help of  Orbán’s “two steps forward, one 
step back” tactic. After Orbán signaled to President 
Barroso that he was prepared to act, and when 
the Hungarian parliament amended the statute of  
the Central Bank, the infringement procedure was 
closed that month. The European Court of  Justice 
had to decide on the other two cases. On Novem-
ber 6, 2012 it ruled that the forced early retirement 
of  judges was incompatible with EU law,36 and on 
April 8, 2014 finally decided the same about the 
new Hungarian data protection regulations.
The political conflict between Hungary and the 
European institutions peaked during the spring of  
2013 in the debate over the fourth amendment to 
the Hungarian Basic Law. The amendment was 
aimed at incorporating all the regulations of  both 
the Basic Law’s transitional provisions and the 
Election Procedure Act into the text of  the Basic 
Law itself, with the exception of  rules regulating 
voter registration. In December and January the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court had already ban-
ned the regulations as unconstitutional, partially 
DGAPanalyse 7 | May 2014
10
for formal reasons and partially for substantial 
reasons. The amendment wanted to exclude the 
possibility of  norm control by the Constitutional 
Court in such cases, and also to prohibit the Con-
stitutional Court from using its former case law in 
the future – judgments and explanatory statements 
that were adopted before the Basic Law came into 
force (January 1, 2012). Despite the fact that both 
Manuel Barroso, president of  the European Com-
mission, and Thorbjørn Jagland, secretary general 
of  the Council of  Europe, protested personally to 
Orbán about the amendment and, together with 
the US State Department, tried to convince him 
to give his consent to a preliminary legal analysis 
by the European Commission prior to adoption 
by Hungarian Parliament, Orbán pushed the law 
through parliament on March 11, 2013. Although 
Hungary was internationally isolated for a while, it 
was slowly but clearly possible to see the signs of  
international and European resignation and exhaus-
tion about Hungary. While the European Parlia-
ment endorsed the Tavares Report,37 a very detailed 
assessment about the situation in the country, with 
many votes among the rows of  the EPP itself, the 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanism propo-
sed by the report were not implemented by either 
the Commission or the Council. In September 
2013 the Hungarian parliament adopted the fifth 
amendment to the Basic Law, thereby correcting 
the regulations affecting the transfer of  cases bet-
ween courts and the issue of  the rules for political 
advertisement in election campaigns. However, the 
usual outcome of  the “two steps forward, one step 
back” tactic, a massive part of  the sensitive and 
problematic regulations of  the fourth amendment 
remained unchanged.
It is evident that Hungary’s relationship with 
European institutions, chiefly the Commission and 
the European Parliament has in recent years been 
shaped not by isolated controversies but by prolon-
ged conflicts never previously experienced in the 
EU. European institutions tried to counteract poli-
tical and legislative dynamics in Hungary that were 
aiming to execute a major restructuring of  the con-
stitutional system for the benefit of  the governing 
parties, and also in an attempt to keep them within 
the limits of  common European rules and stan-
dards. But the Hungarian government’s “two steps 
forward, one step back” tactic, combined with 
the lack of  motivation for explicit political action, 
resulted in largely thwarting these efforts.
Hungary remains a democratic country, and und-
oubtedly the democratic will of  the Hungarian peo-
ple decided which government they want during 
the parliamentary elections in 2014. But other 
elements of  liberal democracy, like checks and 
balances and rule of  law, have been significantly 
weakened over the last few years. And the longer 
Hungary continues its journey in this direction, the 
further it will end up from the Europe it had for 
decades dreamed of  joining.
2. Perspectives
2.1. Regional and European dynamics: 
Hungary in the EU and in the V4
Hardly any EU member state was able to remain 
unaffected by the various economic and political 
consequences of  the crisis in the years after 2008. 
The crisis not only shocked European societies and 
decision makers but also contributed to further 
structural development of  European integration. 
The sometimes federalist, sometimes intergovern-
mental steps that aimed at deepening functional 
and political integration within the eurozone also 
contributed to the accelerated “two-speed Europe” 
and “flexible integration” processes within the 
EU. In this integration scenario Hungary undoub-
tedly belongs to the second speed group. On the 
other hand, not only did the crises directly affect 
integration politics but, as the current Hungarian 
Foreign Policy Strategy paper states, “it is a general 
tendency due to the economic and social challen-
ges that the foreign and Europe policies of  each 
country are increasingly determined by domestic 
political considerations.”38 This is a foreign and 
European policy approach that is hardly valid in 
any other member states, even the most Euroscep-
tic ones. Internal developments of  questionable 
political character (described and analyzed above) 
stood in a strong interrelationship in the form 
of  an interaction triangle both with the country’s 
position and appraisal within the EU and with the 
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qualitative development of  the Hungarian policy 
toward the European Union. The main outcome of  
this dynamic was a major shift in Hungarian for-
eign policy attitudes toward European integration, a 
turning away from the integration and performance 
based “EUphoric” approach to another behavior, 
which this paper calls “pragmatic adhocism”. Based 
on the analysis and interpretation of  interviews 
made with officials from the Hungarian ministry 
of  foreign affairs (MFA) and of  the current foreign 
policy strategy, “pragmatic adhocism” displays two 
main characteristics: (1) There is no one compre-
hensive Hungarian strategy toward European inte-
gration that defines goals and development paths 
for the country’s policymaking, the main argument 
for this being that the country would most likely 
be unable to realize it. And as consequence of  
this, (2) Budapest accepts the existence of  a “two-
speed European integration” and answers it with 
a pragmatic “variable geometry” policy toward 
the EU. This means that instead of  following a 
coherent strategy, Budapest’s political decisions and 
partnership networks vary significantly depending 
on the different issues and policy fields. The only 
two guidelines are national interest and the “values” 
of  Hungarian foreign policy defined on an ad hoc 
basis.
Although there are different references to this 
“value base,” all of  them are strongly linked to the 
concept of  a “Europe of  Nations.” According 
to the current Hungarian Foreign Policy Strategy, 
universal values (like peace, security, democracy, 
human rights, social responsibility and the indivi-
dual and collective rights of  minorities) are tightly 
and organically followed by “national basic values” 
defined in the form of  national sovereignty, both 
individual and collective rights of  minorities, and 
the “sense of  shared national belonging spanning 
borders”.39 The harmonization of  interests and 
values happens again without clear priorities, but 
as the strategy formulates it, based on the analysis 
of  relevant circumstances – in other words – in an 
ad hoc manner. Analyzing interviews with leading 
officials from the ministry of  foreign affairs, the 
value structure of  the current Hungarian foreign 
and European policy can be described in the fol-
lowing way:
(1) Hungary is clearly interested in a strong and 
united Europe.
(2) Social and cultural cohesion and demographic 
sustainability in the European Union are crucial 
dimensions of  the fitness and strength of  this 
integration. From the Hungarian perspective 
this has two main consequences:
a) Europe is strong when its member states 
are strong. And this recognition will lead to 
the acceptance of  “different national ways” 
within the scope of  European integration (a 
“Europe of  Nations”).
b) The social and cultural cohesion of  Europe 
can only be secured on the basis of  com-
mon Christian values (“Christian Europe”).40
(3) Hungary rejects any form of  “federation by 
stealth” but on the other hand, accepts the fact 
of  flexible integration, as long as it remains 
open for later accessions.
When this value and interest base is compared to 
the similar section of  the country’s 2008 External 
Relations Strategy,41 it is clear that no part has been 
changed as drastically as this one. On the other 
hand, no substantial change took place as far as 
the strategic priorities of  Hungarian foreign policy 
are concerned – perhaps “just” a symbolic switch 
in the hierarchy. Issues related to Euro-Atlantic 
integration, including all EU affairs, were relegated 
to second place following the priority of  neighbor-
hood policy and regional relations, the latter also 
comprising policies toward Hungarian minorities 
living abroad. “Global opening” is held to be the 
third priority.42 This structural and symbolic sub-
ordination of  European affairs vis-à-vis interstate 
relations in the neighboring regions determined 
by national interest and minority politics reflects 
clearly the switch from “EUphoria” to a more 
pragmatic, more nation-centered and conservative 
value oriented approach.
Another area that illustrates this symbolic change 
has been the quality of  public political speeches 
in Hungary. This paper cannot undertake a com-
prehensive overview of  all the country’s political 
discourses, but will concentrate on just the public 
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speeches by Viktor Orbán, prime minister bet-
ween 1998 and 2002 and again since 2010. The 
phenomenon of  “double talk” where European 
affairs are concerned exists in nearly all member 
states of  the European Union. There is often a 
huge difference between what the politician says 
at the European and at the national level. But 
only in a few member states has anti-European 
discourse reached such a level as in the Orbán 
speeches of  recent years. The comparison of  the 
European Union to the Soviet Union and Brus-
sels to Moscow in his national holiday address on 
March 15, 2012, and his often used phrase “fight 
for independence”43 against external influence 
(represented mainly by foreign investors and multi-
national companies in the economic sector, and by 
the European Union in political terms) shows that 
European integration, or at least some institutional 
and policy dimensions of  it, are currently seen as 
threats by Hungarian decision makers. And they are 
presented both as threats and as an “image of  the 
enemy” to the Hungarian public. Even though this 
“image of  the enemy” is flexible and refers mostly 
to the current political conflicts of  the Hungarian 
government, it clearly reflects how European inte-
gration has changed from “something wanted” to 
“something alien” and how the discursive categori-
zation of  Europe turned from “we” to “they” in 
Hungarian government communications. That the 
spirit of  this policy pervades not only in political 
communication but also in political action – and 
that the Orbán government is ready to act against 
important European values and principles when 
it serves to stabilize its position of  power – could 
be a logical conclusion of  the issues noted above. 
And if  one accepts this conclusion, it can have 
far reaching consequences. If  the focus remains 
exclusively on the foreign political actions and 
communications of  the Hungarian government, 
then even the change in the foreign political dis-
course, the partial devaluation of  European affairs, 
the prioritizing of  national interest (in the sense 
of  the “Europe of  Nations” concept) does not 
seem to be disturbing or dangerous, because these 
elements remain within all manner of  current 
European political discourse. It could be said that 
Hungary is looking for its own way and a new 
“Sinatra doctrine” could be introduced in the inte-
gration theory but that this way can be interpreted 
as a European way. But if  we also put the country’s 
internal political and economic development under 
the microscope, what we can see is not necessarily 
very comforting. Whether the dynamics of  Hun-
garian politics will remain within the discursive, 
value and political frames of  European integration, 
or whether the Hungarian way will evolve from a 
European one into a “third way scenario,” can only 
be judged in the longer term.
If  the focus of  the analysis is moved from the EU to 
the Visegrad cooperation, it can be seen how many 
different interpretational frames exist for the V4. Set-
ting aside those discourses that stem from diplomats 
who work mainly in this field (and are consequently 
always very enthusiastic) and those who aim to per-
form good public relations for the V4 (to enhance 
the group’s influence at European level together with 
the Hungarian influence within it) and taking a broa-
der strategic look, it becomes evident that Visegrad 
is only one of  the interest representation forums for 
Hungarian foreign politics, even if  it is one of  the 
most important. The rule of  “pragmatic adhocism” 
also applies to Hungary’s Visegrad cooperation, which 
means that regardless of  the existing common cul-
tural and historical heritage, it is first and foremost 
a platform for Hungarian foreign policy to enhance 
its influence at the EU level in different policy fields 
where there is a pragmatic common interest among 
the Visegrad states. Secondly, the V4 is a framework 
for the management of  neighborhood relations, 
though not in all fields. Historical and past political 
experiences show that it is not a conflict management 
or mediation platform. Neither real interest con-
flicts nor symbolic tensions find their way onto the 
agenda either in the V4’s European or neighborhood 
dimensions. However, according to the current For-
eign Policy Strategy, the V4 is a useful framework for 
representing common interests and positions more 
effectively in the field of  energy and cohesion policy, 
the development of  transport infrastructure, and even 
the common foreign policy interest toward a more 
dynamic European Eastern Partnership and Western-
Balkan enlargement policy. Certainly it is more effici-
ent than anything any of  these member states could 
achieve on their own.44 Last but not least, the V4 also 
has an increasing pragmatic importance as a conse-
quence of  the growing trade volumes between the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
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Even if  there are some uncertainties concerning 
the future European role of  the Visegrad Group, 
the cooperation has flourished in recent years, and 
this renaissance can be traced back to two impor-
tant factors. The first of  these is the aforementi-
oned shaping of  the group as a “pragmatic ad hoc 
cooperation platform” along clear common interest 
lines. Although there is unquestionably a common 
cultural background among the Visegrad States, 
which plays an important role in mutual under-
standing and internal communication between the 
countries, its role should not be overestimated.45 
Contrary to the common belief  and prevailing 
public relations, history is a factor that not only 
connects but to a certain extent also divides the 
Visegrad countries. When we consider the medieval 
or early modern period – and most importantly, the 
common experiences during the period of  state 
socialism – the commonalities are in many cases 
self-evident. But the first half  of  the twentieth 
century left behind a very divisive heritage. The 
politically complex and unresolved issue of  the 
Beneś decrees is perhaps the tip of  the iceberg – 
an issue that is perhaps more often discussed in the 
Czech Republic and in Slovakia than in Hungary.46 
Nevertheless, Visegrad has already experienced 
“bad weather” periods, e.g. between 2006 and 2010, 
when emblematic conflicts between Slovakia and 
Hungary at high political levels overrode possible 
cooperation at the policy level which was needed. 
The first key factor in the current constructive 
cooperation is the above-mentioned pragmatism, 
which foresees an active cooperation in issues and 
policy fields where clear common interests exist, 
and does not incorporate issues that could cause 
division. From this perspective, V4 is not an all-
round alliance but a practical ad hoc cooperation 
platform. If  any conflict emerges among partners, 
it is better not to involve it in the V4 frameworks, 
otherwise it could only diminish the cooperation in 
general, as earlier examples have clearly illustrated.
The second key factor in Visegrad’s success was 
the (unfortunately rather slow) appreciation of  V4 
common power and influence at the European 
level, especially in the Council of  the European 
Union. According to the voting mechanism in the 
Council laid down in the Treaty of  Nice, the V4 
combined has the same number of  votes (58) as 
Germany and France together.47 But it must not be 
forgotten that this voting mechanism will only be 
in use until October 31, 2014, after which it will be 
replaced by the double-majority rule laid down in 
the Treaty of  Lisbon. According to the provisions 
of  the Treaty of  Lisbon in the transitional period 
up to March 31, 2017, any member state can 
request the use of  the Nice rules for a particular 
vote or can call for the application of  the “Ioan-
nina Compromise”. However, the days of  the V4’s 
numerical weight are numbered. The four countries 
will represent only 14.285 percent of  the member 
states and 12.62 percent of  the European popula-
tion. Nevertheless, a big difference can be found 
in how a blocking minority can be established in 
the Council. Until now, this required 91 votes or at 
least 38 percent of  EU population. With their 58 
votes and some allies, the V4 Group alone was not 
far from the threshold of  91 votes, irrespective of  
their population ratio. Under the new rules, a blo-
cking minority can be constituted by at least four 
member states representing at least 35 percent of  
the EU population. This will bring the V4 far from 
the threshold of  a blocking minority when large 
member states do not support it. The effect and 
consequences of  this change are barely predictable.
The new rules could well lead to the devaluation 
of  the V4 as a cooperation platform in the EU, 
because although it would continue to allow the 
formulation and communication of  common inte-
rests, they will no longer make it possible to effec-
tively represent them. Nevertheless this “devalua-
tion scenario” applies to all current regional groups 
of  smaller member states in the EU not just to the 
V4. The other possible development path could be 
identified as the “networking scenario” by which 
regional groups of  smaller member states preserve 
their influence by cooperating among the regional 
groups more closely. Such initiatives are not neces-
sarily new for the Visegrad countries. They have 
proven to be pioneers in this field with the flexible 
cooperation format Visegrad Plus, which involves 
Romania, Austria, Slovenia and other countries, as 
well as with the existing links with the Benelux and 
Baltic countries (V4+B3) and the Nordic Council. 
Visegrad Plus could become the basic format of  
interest representation for the future. Whether it 
will increase the influence of  the current Visegrad 
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Group as a whole (when all four countries can 
maintain their central role in game) is again a ques-
tion for the future. The networking scenario and 
the mainstreaming of  Visegrad Plus could theoreti-
cally also lead to fragmentation among the original 
four members or to a development in which the 
V4’s original common cultural background and his-
torical consciousness slowly diminishes and in the 
end Visegrad Plus will hardly be distinguished from 
the numerous ever-changing coalitions along diffe-
rent European legislative and political issues. The 
question “qou vadis, Visegrad” is more relevant 
than ever.
Current Hungarian foreign policy has other ideas 
as to how the transformation of  the voting sys-
tem in the Council of  the European Union might 
influence the future of  the Visegrad cooperation. 
According to the current Foreign Policy Strat-
egy, priority should be given to increasing V4’s 
international prestige, and it does not envisage 
any expansion of  the cooperation. On the other 
hand, interviews with leading Hungarian officials 
from the ministry of  foreign affairs show that the 
policymakers always emphasize the openness of  
Visegrad positions and the readiness of  the partici-
pating countries to represent the common interest 
in cooperation with other EU partners. This means 
that the institutional and symbolic form of  the V4 
will probably remain unchanged in the future, alt-
hough preparations for anchoring and positioning 
it in greater regional and functional cooperation 
networks demanded by the new decisionmaking 
process in the Council after 2014/2017 are still 
ongoing.
2.2. Economic and monetary union and the 
questions of further fiscal and monetary 
integration
No phenomenon in the history of  European inte-
gration has made the existence of  a two-speed or 
multi-speed integration as incontestable, self-evi-
dent, and unavoidable as the financial crisis experi-
enced since 2008. It has pushed eurozone members 
struggling for the survival of  the common currency 
into further integration forms. Meanwhile, non-
eurozone member states, and especially the East-
Central-European ones, have found themselves 
lagging behind like second-class member states on 
the periphery. Different countries opted for diffe-
rent political paths to answer the challenge. Unlike 
Estonia and Latvia, which accelerated the process 
complying with the Maastricht criteria and success-
fully managed accession to the monetary union 
in a very short time, or Poland, which repeatedly 
stressed its efforts and strong intention to comply 
with the criteria and join as soon as possible (thus 
avoiding losing influence in the integration process), 
Hungary choose another strategy.
In keeping with the principle of  “pragmatic adho-
cism”, the Hungarian approach to the reform and 
further deepening of  the Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU) is both diverse and structured. 
According to Hungarian MFA officials, the country 
officially supports the EMU reform process, but 
not at all costs. Hungary is obviously deeply inte-
rested in a well functioning and strong eurozone, 
though not primarily from a monetary but more 
from a broader economic perspective. European 
monetary policy does not affect the country in 
practical terms, but as nearly 70 percent of  its 
exports go to eurozone member states, Buda-
pest is inevitably concerned about the vitality of  
these markets. Theoretically Budapest supports all 
reform proposals in the eurozone, if  
• they do not aim at further institutionalization;
• they are not compulsory for non-eurozone 
member states but are left open so that member 
states can join voluntarily at a later date; 
• they do not affect the member states’ compe-
tencies in connection with tax sovereignty; 
• they do not support “federalism by stealth”.
If  this position could be formulated in a single 
phrase, it would use the words of  a planning staff  
diplomat: “The Eurozone should solve its prob-
lems, but in a way that does not harm us.”
Concerning the concrete measures, Budapest, after 
signaling some concerns together with the Czech 
Republic, later left the club of  opposing countries 
and supported the European Fiscal Compact and 
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in March 2013 ratified as a non-eurozone mem-
ber state the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination, and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (TSCG). It was an important 
sign that Hungary is ready to take steps to avoid 
further political marginalization in the EU. And 
also a necessary step, not only in light of  the ques-
tionable constitutional and legislative adventures 
implemented in the country but also from the 
perspective that Hungary did not participate in the 
previous project of  the Euro Plus Pact in March 
2011. On that occasion, this non-attendance might 
have raised the suspicion that Hungary was plan-
ning on joining the eurosceptic club (of  the UK, 
the Czech Republic and Sweden) for the long term, 
but fortunately these fears were never realized in 
practice. It is important to stress that in cases when 
the government refused its support for different 
projects and proposals – like the Euro Plus Pact or 
the introduction of  a European Financial Transac-
tion Tax (FTT) – it happened mainly to safeguard 
national economic policy sovereignty. In other 
words, the decisions were made on the basis of  the 
political attitude toward European integration and 
not on the basis of  economic policy considerations. 
Hungary has followed a very strict fiscal policy 
since 2008, which has helped it avoid state insol-
vency on many occasions. And even though there 
is a huge difference between pre and post 2010 cri-
sis management of  the social-liberal and Fidesz-led 
governments (mainly concerning the involvement 
of  the IMF and other international actors), this 
strict fiscal policy was extensively implemented 
throughout the whole period, so joining the Euro 
Plus Pact would not constitute a further burden 
for Budapest. But it included the proposal for the 
introduction of  the Common Consolidated Cor-
porate Tax Base (CCCTB), which crossed the “red 
line” of  the current Hungarian integration policy, 
questioning the member states’ tax sovereignty, 
just as the FTT proposal did. Despite the fact that 
Hungary itself  established a financial transaction 
tax during 2013, it rejected a European FTT for 
these reasons.
Hungarian foreign policy is fairly skeptical as far 
as the possibility of  comprehensive European 
treaty reform is concerned. According to planning 
staff  officials, a prolonged debate about the treaty 
structure would necessarily weaken the EU, while 
treaty reform or just the further development of  
the EMU would not necessarily make it more suc-
cessful. Should this happen, however – and this 
is something that cannot really be influenced by 
Budapest – then treaty reform is for Hungary pre-
ferable to an intergovernmental solution that would 
further fragment European integration.
Concerning Hungary’s accession to the eurozone, 
there are at least common denominators for all 
Hungarian policy stakeholders. First of  all, as a 
consequence of  the accession treaty, a legal obli-
gation exists for the country to enter the monetary 
union in the undetermined future. Secondly, the 
question is politically not an issue of  immediate 
importance, and even the change in the Polish 
position concerning the importance of  the intro-
duction of  the euro could not positively influence 
Hungarian decisionmakers. Nevertheless, many 
stakeholders in the Hungarian MFA share the 
position that if  Hungary would like to count in the 
European Union, and would like to maintain an 
appropriate influence on how the integration deve-
lops in the future, the country must join the euro-
zone. On the other hand, attitudes in other relevant 
ministries are not necessarily as supportive as in 
the MFA, and strong actors share the opinion (as 
they have in a latent but influential way since 2004) 
that a sovereign national monetary policy constitu-
tes a key factor in the country’s further economic 
growth and catching-up to the economic level of  
older member states. This is why, even though the 
country has never been as close to complying with 
the Maastricht criteria as it is now, the political will 
to join the eurozone has perhaps never been so 
tepid.
Hungary’s budget deficit reached +4.3 percent and 
-2.0 percent in 2011 and 2012,48 fulfilling in two 
consecutive years the -3 percent threshold criteria, 
although the budget surplus from 2011 is a result 
of  nationalizing the private pension insurance 
funds and is thus not a sustainable figure. The 
debt-to-GDP ratio reached 82.1 percent, 79.8 per-
cent, and 79.2 percent, respectively, in the last three 
years. Because of  these decreasing tendencies, the 
European Commission qualified this benchmark as 
fulfilled, even though the figures are above the 60 
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percent Maastricht limit. The annual inflation rate 
reached 3.9 percent in 2011, 5.7 percent in 2012, 
and 1.7 percent in 201349 with volatile changes, but 
as the “benchmark countries” (the three EU mem-
ber states with the lowest HCIP rates) changed in 
this time frame, their inflation average also changed 
significantly. In March 2012, when the reference 
rate was 3.2 percent,50 Hungary fulfilled the criteria 
according to the European Commission with its 
twelve month average, at that time 4.3 percent.51 
Owing to the volatility of  Hungarian inflation 
development, matching the criteria is even more 
occasional than not and is dependent on many 
external factors (e.g. energy prices), but the country 
has rarely been so close to meeting the inflation 
benchmark as recently. A similar development can 
also be observed in the case of  the long-term inte-
rest rate criteria, albeit again with a great volatility 
caused mainly by the country’s need for external 
financing. The twelve-month average of  Hunga-
rian ten year bond yields dithered above 7 percent 
during 2012 and 2013, while the benchmark remai-
ned close to 4.8 percent, again nearly missing the 
permitted 2 percent difference.52 Whether these 
figures are sustainable or not and whether they 
belong to a stable or to a decreasing economy – is 
subject to wide and intensive debate.53 It remains 
true that the figures have almost never been so 
close to the required benchmarks, and while the 
government could emphasize its intent to move 
nearer to monetary integration, the signs it gives 
are quite the opposite.
The new Hungarian Basic Law defines the forint 
(HUF) as “the official currency of  Hungary,”54 giving 
a constitutional rank to the national currency and 
limiting possibility of  introducing the euro without 
a two-thirds constitutional majority in parliament. 
Whether or not this step conforms with the country’s 
EU accession treaty, which prescribes the future intro-
duction of  the euro as a clear legal obligation, can 
again be a subject of  discussion. The fact remains 
that Hungary never joined the ERM II, which means 
that the country is always at least two years away from 
the introduction of  the common European currency. 
This step can be easily taken when a sustainable Euro/
HUF central rate could be found, which would reflect 
a serious intention toward the EMU.
However, under the abovementioned circumstances, 
and with the lack of  any serious political moti-
vation to move in the direction of  the eurozone, 
Hungarian foreign policy can do only one thing. It 
can try to hold open the doors for accession in the 
distant future so that the country can join the euro-
zone as an equal partner, fulfilling the same obliga-
tions as everybody else in the club.
2.3. Energy and climate
It is hard to find a policy field in which Visegrad 
countries have such a strong and well-elaborated 
common position as European energy policy.55 
If  this common position on energy and climate 
issues could be summed up, it would be identified 
as emphasizing the principles of  supply security, 
competitiveness, and the national competence to 
determine the appropriate energy mix – naturally in 
conformity with the climate and energy policy obli-
gation formulated in the EU’s Lisbon and Europe 
2020 strategies.
The fundamentals of  Hungary’s energy policy are 
laid down in the National Energy Strategy 2030 
(NES) adopted by the government in July 2011. 
The document identifies (1) securing energy supply; 
(2) enhancing competitiveness; and (3) promoting 
sustainability as the three pillars of  Hungary’s future 
energy policy. They stand in synergic relationship 
with each other and are succeeded by the following 
five policy components: (1) enhancing energy effici-
ency; (2) increasing decentralized use of  renewable 
energy sources; (3) further exploiting of  safe nuclear 
energy, which alone could allow a broader electrifi-
cation of  the transport sector; (4) enhancing bipolar 
use of  agriculture for energy production; and last 
but not least (5) fully connecting to the European 
energy networks and further improving them. Ano-
ther interest is the preservation of  the Hungarian 
coal and lignite mining capacities, as a partially stra-
tegic reserve, which could contribute to the mainte-
nance of  a moderate natural gas consumption and 
supply price, a crucial question of  competitiveness 
for the Hungarian industry.
The role of  energy security can be easily under-
stood by the supply side of  the current Hungarian 
energy mix.56 The primary energy consumption of  
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the country in 2011 was 1072 petajoules (PJ). It 
was covered to 37.8 percent by natural gas, to 26.6 
percent by crude oil, and to 10.5 percent by coal 
– 74.9 percent by fossil energy resources in total. 
The share of  nuclear energy and renewables was 
15.7 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively in addi-
tion to 2.1 percent from other sources. Some 74 
percent of  natural gas consumption, and nearly 99 
percent of  the crude oil supply, is imported from 
the Russian Federation via the Brotherhood Gas 
Pipeline and Druzhba Oil Pipeline. Concerning 
gross electricity production, which reached 37.37 
TWh in 2011, 43.7 percent of  this was covered by 
the four reactor blocks of  the Paks nuclear power 
plant, 31.3 percent by natural gas, 16.7 percent by 
coal and other solid fuels, 8.1 percent by renewab-
les, and finally 1.3 percent by crude oil. Hungary is 
also a net electricity importer of  around 13 percent 
of  its annual gross electricity consumption, even 
if  the import is seasonal and focuses mainly on 
the summer months. The country’s exposure to 
and dependence on Russian energy supply is self-
evident though not as serious as with other East 
Central European or even Visegrad countries (e.g. 
Slovakia), as past Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes 
and supply crises have shown.
Such supply crises have, however, provided a great 
impetus for Hungarian energy policy to diversify 
supply routes, enhance regional energy networks, 
make up for lacking interconnectors with the 
neighboring countries, and further develop the 
country’s unique strategic gas reserve capacities.
The matter of  energy dependency is, as with other 
countries in the region, most urgent with regard to 
gas imports. This is not only because of  the much 
lower share of  crude oil in the energy mix, or the 
seasonal character and low intensity of  electricity 
imports, but also because of  the existing infrastruc-
ture, which allows use of  alternative supply routes 
for these other resources. The import of  crude oil 
is also possible from the Adriatic Sea via the Adri-
atic branch of  the Druzhba oil pipeline. As far as 
electricity import is concerned, there is no similar 
dependency phenomenon. Hungary receives appro-
ximately 68 percent of  its imported electricity from 
Slovakia (6.0 TWh in 2009)57 and a much lower 
share from Ukraine (2.7 TWh in 2009). Hungary 
also exports a large amount of  electricity, mainly 
to Croatia (3.3 TWh) and Serbia (1.3 TWh). The 
capacity of  the existing electricity interconnectors 
is 30 percent of  domestic generation capacity, and 
the level of  cross-border traded electricity amounts 
to 40 percent of  the total electricity supply. This 
is clearly a high figure compared to the 7 percent 
IEA average. Further interconnectors to Austria 
and Croatia were implemented in the last few 
years, while others to Slovakia are under negotia-
tion. These additional Hungarian-Slovakian grids 
can play an important role in the future, allowing a 
more significant north-south electricity flow, which 
is necessary for the fully effective utilization of  
renewable energy investments in North Germany 
and mastering the harmful “loop flow” pheno-
menon in the Visegrad countries. In a nutshell, 
if  we also consider the coupling of  the Czech-
Slovakian-Hungarian electricity market, which 
has been operational since September 2012, it is 
safe to say that the interconnection level of  the 
Hungarian electricity grid is much more develo-
ped than it is for example, in the case of  gas, so 
the security of  energy supply cannot be so easily 
endangered. Nevertheless, some further electricity 
interconnection clusters are recognized as “projects 
of  common interest” (PCI) under the aegis of  the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).58
Concerning the strategic question of  gas supply 
and the decentralization of  the supply routes, 
Hungary has followed a very pragmatic strategy 
and supported both of  the competing macro level 
projects in the region, which aim to open new 
transit routes that avoid Ukraine. These include 
the Nabucco and South Stream projects. Following 
this path and trying to avoid betting everything 
on one card, Budapest was even ready to risk very 
sharp US criticism when it signed the agreement 
about the participation in the South Stream project 
in February 2008. The opposition, led by Fidesz 
at the time, sharply criticized the socialist-liberal 
government for this and called the South Stream 
agreement “treason.” But after coming to power in 
2010, the Orbán government effectively followed 
the same strategy regarding the pipeline projects. 
Moreover, the government not only continued the 
high-level energy cooperation with Russia in the 
gas sector but has further deepened it with a highly 
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controversial credit and implementation agreement 
on the modernization of  the Paks nuclear plant, 
which was signed in January 2014.
Hungarian national energy companies have had a 
reasonable share in the implementation of  both gas 
pipeline projects, securing the Hungarian national 
interest for appropriate gas supply. Nabucco’s sus-
pension in June 2013 has obviously overshadowed 
the project in Hungarian energy policy planning. 
On the other hand, regardless of  the European 
Commission’s objection to South Stream in early 
December 2013, the Hungarian government and 
Gazprom reiterated their intent to start with the 
construction of  the Hungarian section of  the pipe-
line in April 2015. It is scheduled to be up and run-
ning as early as 2017. South Stream Transport Hun-
gary, the company responsible for the construction 
and operation of  the pipeline, is a 50-50 percent 
joint venture between Gazprom and the state-
owned Hungarian Electricity Works (MVM). As it 
is formulated in the Hungarian National Energy 
Strategy, “the well-balanced partnership with Rus-
sia is an essential element of  Hungarian energy 
supply security.”59 This very pragmatic approach 
has been followed by all the very different Hunga-
rian governments. Hungary’s long-term oil-price-
indexed contract with Gazprom runs out in 2015 
and has to be re-negotiated soon. Even though the 
Visegrad countries always complain about the com-
paratively higher gas prices, they need to accept 
that to date there has been no initiative to establish 
a common body to bargain with the Russian sup-
plier. And as Hungarian officials have said, there is 
currently no chance for a common position, as the 
three other Visegrad states have already re-negotia-
ted and extended their contracts during the last few 
years. A common re-negotiation of  the price level, 
as Poland did in 2012, could be seen as a logical 
step but unfortunately has no chance of  political 
realization.
The other strategic axis of  the gas supply infra-
structure development – the north-south pipeline 
interconnection – displays in contrast strong com-
mon Visegrad interests and features. The project 
is identified as a priority project of  the European 
Energy Infrastructure Package, and its work is 
coordinated in the EU’s High Level Group for 
North-South Interconnections. The main aim of  
the project is to allow bidirectional gas flow among 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hun-
gary, linking the liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals 
in Poland and Croatia. Although many branches 
of  the pipeline are recognized as “projects of  
common interests” (PCI)60 under the aegis of  the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) program (which 
allows European financial support for the projects) 
Hungarian officials consider the implementation 
work to be very intensive on a bilateral level, espe-
cially in terms of  the preparatory and coordination 
measures required for the investments.
According to the National Energy Strategy, Hungary 
does not aim to realize a concrete form of  energy 
mix. Instead, Hungarian energy policy tries to gua-
rantee the country’s secure energy supply, taking eco-
nomic competitiveness, ecological sustainability, and 
the consumers’ purchase power into consideration. 
These priorities are currently translated into the form 
of  the so-called “Nuclear-Green-Coal” scenario. It 
is restricted to the field of  electricity production and 
primarily foresees the long-term maintenance of  the 
level of  nuclear power within the energy mix, which 
would keep the CO2 emission levels from electri-
city production within set limits. The four 500 MW 
reactor blocks of  the Paks nuclear power plant will 
be definitively decommissioned between 2032 and 
2037. According to the agreement signed in Moscow 
on January 14, 2014 between Zsuzsanna Németh, 
Hungarian minister for national development and 
Sergey Kiriyenko, chairman of  the Russian company 
Rosatom, construction work on the two VVER-1200 
reactors with 1200 MW gross capacity will start in 
2015 and be completed in 2023. Some 80 percent 
of  the investment will be covered by a Russian loan 
worth 10 billion euros. However, at the time of  wri-
ting, many circumstances that could endanger the 
project’s future are still unclear. First of  all, the whole 
procedure seems to violate European public procu-
rement obligations, which could lead to intervention 
by the European Commission. Moreover, a 10 billion 
euro loan for the state-owned Hungarian Electricity 
Company (MVM) with state responsibility also seems 
to violate the debt limit rules of  the new Hungarian 
Basic Law.61 Despite some remaining uncertainties 
with regard to the Hungarian nuclear power plant 
expansion plans, the national energy strategy foresees 
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that, with these capacities, Hungary could reduce its 
electricity imports and could become an electricity 
exporter by the time the last old reactor block is taken 
out of  service in 2037.
As far as the coal component of  the “Nuclear-
Green-Coal” scenario is concerned, there are two 
main reasons for maintaining coal’s share in elec-
tricity production. First of  all, the country still has 
approximately 10.5 billion tons of  coal and lignite 
ready to be mined, which constitutes an important 
internal backup energy resource in the event of  
a gas or other energy supply crises. On the other 
hand, it must be noted that, with the spread of  
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, a cli-
mate-friendly increase of  coal’s share of  the energy 
mix could well be possible in the future. From this 
perspective, the continuous preservation of  the 
professional culture, human resource, and techno-
logical background of  coal and lignite mining once 
again takes on strategic importance.
The Hungarian energy policy landscape is a bit 
more complicated when it comes to the use of  
green energy and renewable sources (RES). The 
presence of  sources like wind and water energy 
in adequate quantity and intensity is limited by 
geographical factors. Wind energy can be used 
effectively mainly in the so-called Pannonian Wind 
Corridor in the western part of  Hungary. On the 
other hand, there are great resources of  geother-
mic energy that could be accessed, through mainly 
for heating and not for electricity production. The 
country’s agricultural circumstances mean that the 
other RES with a broad supply basis in Hungary 
is biomass. This could enable further decentraliza-
tion of  energy supply in rural areas, but again does 
not necessarily allow an excessive restructuring of  
the energy production toward more intensive use 
of  RES. At the end of  2012, wind turbines with a 
total capacity of  328.93 MW were installed in the 
country, representing 42 percent of  all renewable 
capacities.62
Hungary’s national climate goals outlined in the 
Europe 2020 strategy imply 20 percent improve-
ment in the field of  energy efficiency, 20 percent 
reduction of  CO2 emissions and a 13 percent 
RES share. Concerning the Gross Final Energy 
Consumption indicator, the portion of  RES in 
2005 was 5.2 percent. This rose to 8.7 percent in 
2010.63 Parallel with the adoption of  the National 
Energy Strategy in 2011, the government increased 
the national CO2 reduction goal to 14.5 percent 
by 2020, aiming to exceed the Europe 2020 goals. 
On the other hand, the energy strategy emphasizes 
the importance of  RES primarily in the context 
of  energy security, and identifies energy efficiency 
measures as key tools in securing the CO2 emis-
sion targets.
As far as the new climate goals to be achieved by 2030 
are concerned, Hungary shared the common Vise-
grad position presented jointly at the Warsaw Climate 
Conference in November 2013. According to this, the 
European Union should not make any legally binding 
unilateral declarations about the reduction of  green-
house gas emissions if  other important global players 
do not accept parallel measures. With regard to “ETS 
backloading”, Hungary has confidence in the new 
EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and is currently 
gathering implementation experiences. Unlike the 
Czech Republic and Poland, Hungary has not asked 
for any exceptional measures. Budapest’s position is to 
make no claims for free allowances, because while the 
costs are undoubtedly present in the EU ETS, there is 
also significant income for the state from auctioning 
allowances. This is an approach that can effectively 
balance the economy at the national level between 
private costs and public income, independent of  the 
price of  the allowances.64
In addition to backloading, Hungary will almost 
certainly also support the Commission’s proposal 
on the new climate goals until 2030. The one and 
only binding greenhouse gas emission reduction 
goal would perfectly reflect the flexible Hungarian 
approach. When countries like Hungary can more 
effectively achieve their emission targets through 
energy efficiency than through the expansion of  
RES, then the way that countries implement cli-
mate policy should remain open and flexible. The 
output is what counts, not how member states 
fulfill their obligations. However, although both 
the Commission proposal and Hungary’s position 
could change significantly during future rounds of  
negotiations, their initial support can at present not 
be questioned.
DGAPanalyse 7 | May 2014
20
2.4. Hungarian priorities and “uploading” at 
the European Political Agenda
According to the Europeanization and domestic 
impact thesis by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, 
one possible path for member states to reduce the 
degree of  “misfit” between European and national-
level policy/politics and to ensure the convergence 
among the two levels is “bottom-up Europeani-
zation” or “uploading”. This consists of  member 
states trying to make their national preferences part 
of  the European political agenda at the community 
level.65 Obviously, each case of  interest representa-
tion can be seen as a form of  uploading, but in this 
section the scope of  the phenomenon is limited to 
the thematization of  something new, but an impor-
tant issue from the national perspective, on the 
European political agenda.
Taking this limitation into consideration, this sec-
tion will try to summarize the most important 
European issues from the perspective of  Hunga-
rian politics, will introduce one real instance of  
“uploading” by the country in recent years, and 
finally will focus on some issues where it is hard 
to decide whether they can be identified as “uploa-
ding” or as “expropriated topics” (because of  the 
fact that the policy elaboration and the thematiza-
tion and representation were divided among diffe-
rent actors in the European Union).
Regardless of  whether we review the “Euphoric” 
phase (up to 2010) or the pragmatic phase (from 
2010) of  Hungarian EU policy, a common element 
is that the European Union was partially promoted 
by – and the policy performance of  the national 
government measured by – the degree to which 
European financial resources were secured from 
the (re)distributive cohesion policy and common 
agricultural policy (CAP).
During the planning of  the Multiannual Financial 
Frames (MFF) for both 2007–13 and 2014–20, 
Budapest’s top priority was to maintain (or possibly 
increase) the budgetary share of  these policy fields 
parallel to securing the highest possible stake for 
the country itself. Because the countries of  the 
2004 EU enlargement round joined during the last 
third of  a running MFF (2000–06) and because 
the budgetary impact of  enlargement were not 
properly taken into account, the preparation of  the 
MFF 2007–13 provided the first possibility for the 
new member states to contribute to and represent 
their interests on an equal level during the prepa-
ration of  the long-term European financial frame. 
The Visegrad countries therefore maintained a 
strong degree of  cooperation in order to avoid 
the divisive strategy that had been used effectively 
against them during the accession negotiations – 
especially concerning agricultural subsidies and 
direct payments. During the preparation of  the 
current MFF (2014–20), all Visegrad countries par-
ticipated in the “Friends of  Cohesion” group, with 
the strategic aim of  counterbalancing the initiative 
of  the net payer countries to decrease the overall 
EU budget and the share of  cohesion policy within 
it. Even though it was not a simple matter effec-
tively to manage a group of  member states who 
not only have a common interest in maximizing 
cohesion policy resources but now also compete 
with each other with regard to the distribution of  
these resources, the “Friends of  Cohesion” perfor-
med well from a Hungarian perspective. Although 
the overall budget for cohesion policy decreased 
slightly (from 347,410 million euros in 2007 pri-
ces for EU 27 compared to 322,332 million euros 
in 2013 prices for EU 28) and Hungary’s share 
fell quite significantly (from 25,307 million euros 
in the period of  2007–13 to 20,498 indicated for 
2014–20), the Hungarian government signaled 
its satisfaction after the birth of  the MFF deal. 
According to officials from the Hungarian MFA, 
this is because the country’s government has had 
significant fears that, as a consequence of  the ques-
tionable constitutional changes and effects on rule 
of  law since 2010, Hungary will be sanctioned with 
a discriminative reduction of  designated resources. 
Thus far these fears have not been realized. Con-
cerning the reform of  cohesion policy, Budapest 
supported the restructuring of  resources to the 
Europe 2020 priority areas, especially supporting 
growth and employment, and was also ready to 
back the German mediation initiative that aimed 
to enhance efficiency in cohesion and agricultural 
policy spending in exchange for maintaining the 
budgetary level.
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In those areas of  the cohesion policy that fall out-
side securing resources, Hungary’s performance has 
changed significantly in recent years. Until 2010 
Hungary had a very ambitious goal: to be among 
the best performing member states in the field of  
cohesion policy. The country’s absorption level 
in 2004–06 reached 107 percent,66 and there was 
some disappointment that the Hungarian com-
missioner could not become responsible for this 
policy area. But after the government change in 
2010 this impressive performance was set back by 
the restructuring of  the national strategic reference 
frame and the institutional structure responsible 
for its implementation, both of  which have had 
a vastly negative effect on absorption. In January 
2013 Hungary was only able to reach a project 
selection rate slightly above 70 percent and a rate 
of  claimed/paid expenditures of  below 40 percent, 
which was only able to rise above 50 percent by the 
end of  the year.67 Even though the financial dimen-
sion of  the country’s European flagship policy was 
secured with the MFF, the implementation is now 
seriously underperforming compared to previous 
government cycles.
The EU’s other important redistributive policy, 
the common agricultural policy (CAP), also has 
special importance from a Hungarian perspective. 
Hungary’s two main priorities are (1) the equaliza-
tion of  direct payments among member states; and 
(2) possibly the limitation or exclusion of  foreign 
ownership of  Hungarian land, mainly with the help 
of  the new 2013 Land Ownership Act, even after 
the land purchase moratorium runs out in April 
2014. According to Hungarian officials, the govern-
ment is even ready to face proceedings before the 
European Court of  Justice (ECJ) regarding this 
topic, which has mainly internal political reasons. 
The governing Fidesz party would obviously not 
like to lose support among more conservative rural 
voters. On the contrary, even though losing the 
case against the Commission could cause some 
damage for the country itself, the political profit 
for Fidesz would be invaluable. The government 
would again be able to present itself  as the loyal 
protector of  the national interest against external 
influence.
The most original Hungarian contribution to the 
current structure of  European integration has most 
certainly been the inclusion of  the protection of  
persons belonging to minorities into the primary 
European law (Art. 2 TEU) and thus a prime 
example of  Hungarian “uploading.” The upheavals 
of  the twentieth century left approximately 2.5–3 
million Hungarians living in neighboring countries 
– a proportionally high number considering that 
Hungary itself  has barely ten million inhabitants. 
According to both the former constitution, after 
1989, and the new Basic Law that has been in force 
since 2012, the Hungarian state bears constitutio-
nal responsibility for Hungarian minorities living 
abroad.68 The country has shown great interest in 
the different international legal instruments for 
protecting minorities since the very beginning of  
the 1990s, and was one of  the first countries to 
sign and ratify the European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages (ECRML) and the Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of  National 
Minorities (FCNM), both treaties adopted under 
the aegis of  the Council of  Europe (CoE).69 There 
was and is, however, a huge difference among CoE 
member states when it comes to adopting and 
implementing these obligations.70 And as a conse-
quence of  the not really minority-friendly nation 
building processes in East Central Europe on the 
one hand, and of  the partial inefficiency of  the 
international legal minority protection instruments 
on the other, Hungary has placed its highest hopes 
on European law and its supranational legal system 
with clear legal compliance obligations.
A further motivation for Hungary’s “uploading” 
was constituted by the so-called “double standards” 
in European minority protection.71 This means that 
candidate countries were committed by the Copen-
hagen Criteria to enhance their minority standards 
but that no similar obligation existed for member 
states. This is due to the fact that only the first 
three Copenhagen political criteria (democracy, rule 
of  law, and fundamental human rights) were ancho-
red in the acquis communautaire by the Treaty 
of  Amsterdam72 as basic values of  the European 
Union, but minority protection was not. Hungary’s 
main fear was that the quality of  minority protec-
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tion might decrease in the new member states after 
the enlargement process, once this enlargement 
commitment no longer exists.
The first time Hungary proposed anchoring the 
“rights of  persons belonging to minorities” among 
the fundamental values of  the European Union 
was when European Constitutional Treaty was 
being prepared by the European Convention in 
2002–03. The initiative was unsuccessful in the 
Convention but was put on the table again during 
the Intergovernmental Conference, and a break-
through was realized during the Italian Council 
presidency in 2003, effectively securing minority 
protection among the EU’s fundamental values. 
After the failure of  the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005, it was possible to include minority protection 
in the Treaty of  Lisbon, thus contributing to the 
current Article 2 TEU. From the current perspec-
tive, this has only been a partial success, because 
no secondary legislation followed the creation of  
this legal anchor in the treaties. And the rejection 
of  the “Minority Safepack”, the European Citizens’ 
Initiative proposal in 2013, with mainly political 
arguments by the European Commission, shows 
that there is currently no political will among the 
European institutions to go further along this road. 
This is not just a disappointment for Budapest but 
has far broader consequences. Both the decrease of  
Hungary’s commitment to maintaining high mino-
rity protection standards for its own minorities and 
its unilateral steps to protect Hungarian minorities 
abroad (which resulted in some political tensions 
both in interstate relations and at European level) 
are partly due to the ineffectiveness of  existing 
international and European minority protection 
standards. The disappointment that no real politi-
cal will exists at the European level to change the 
situation in fact constitutes an excellent political 
resource for nationalist oriented and rightwing 
political parties, like Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary, 
which can effectively use the issue for political 
mobilization purposes.
Two other macro-projects in Hungarian policy 
toward the EU are related to the country’s Coun-
cil presidency during the first half  of  2011. Both 
the “European Framework Strategy for Roma 
Inclusion” and the “EU Strategy for the Danube 
Region” were adopted during this period and were 
greatly supported by the Hungarian presidency. 
Hungarian thinking on foreign policy often refers 
to these projects as its “own children” and tries to 
“expropriate” them with the aim of  demonstrating 
the influence and success of  Hungary’s EU policy. 
Nevertheless, Hungary did a lot for the preparation 
and adoption of  these political projects, especially 
by gathering the appropriate political support in 
the Council, al though substantial elaboration of  the 
projects relied on the European Commission. Hun-
gary was not in fact among the initiators of  the 
Danube Strategy,73 and even though the Hungarian 
MEP Lívia Járóka, as the parliamentary rapporteur 
of  the issue, contributed a lot to the final form 
and content of  the Roma Framework Strategy, the 
Commission still had an earlier policy targeting the 
social integration of  Roma minority in Europe.74 
For these reasons, the Danube Strategy and the 
Roma Framework Strategy cannot be explicitly 
identified as examples of  Hungarian “uploading” 
to the European political agenda. Despite this fact, 
Hungary performed a very active and motivated 
involvement in these fields, and certainly not inad-
vertently. Cross-border cooperation, transnational 
regionalism, and minority issues are and will remain 
both value- and interest-motivated priorities of  
Hungarian policy both at the international level and 
within the EU. And if  there were more readiness 
on the part of  European partners to allow progress 
toward a more efficient minority protection sys-
tem in the EU, it could, on the one hand, prevent 
unilateral Hungarian steps in this field and, on the 
other hand, enable the further “uploading” of  a 
very human and very European “lesson learned” 
through the history of  the twentieth century. This 
could most certainly contribute to the architecture 
of  the “common European house” in a positive 
way.
2.5. Economic and foreign policy partner-
ship networks
Hungary has an extremely open, export-oriented 
economy and one that is highly integrated with the 
European market. From an economic and histori-
cal perspective, the source of  this integration is not 
necessarily EU membership per se. The accession 
partnership can be identified as a more crucial 
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factor, as it resulted in a mutual market opening 
process until complete free trade liberalization was 
achieved between 1994 and 2004. According to this, 
the accession to the EU contributed mainly to the 
development of  trade relations with the other for-
mer candidate countries – thereafter member states 
– and not with the EU15 itself.
The “organic Hungarian economic space” stret-
ches, from the trade relations perspective, over 
Germany, Austria, northern Italy, and the other 
Visegrad countries. Together these made up appro-
ximately 48.39 percent of  the total Hungarian 
trade volume in 2011.75 Germany’s share alone was 
around 24.94 percent, underlining the country’s 
role as Hungary’s top economic partner in nearly 
all aspects. Hungary’s trade surplus with Germany 
was approximately 2.17 billion euros. For Austria 
and Italy, it was 5.8 percent and 4.7 percent, respec-
tively.76 The other three Visegrad countries together 
represented 12.95 percent of  the Hungarian trade 
volume, bringing them second only to Germany as 
the most important partner when taken together.77 
China’s contribution was around 3.66 percent, 
approximately the same level as the Czech Republic. 
There is, however a huge trade deficit in relation to 
China: 3.1 billion euros for Hungary with an annual 
6 percent decrease in Hungarian imports and incre-
asing exports. Last but not least, the country’s trade 
balance reached 6.9 billion euros total surplus, per-
forming a 10.3 billion euro surplus in the European 
region and a 4.58 billion euro deficit in the Asian 
region.
Concerning foreign direct investments (FDI) in 
Hungary, approximately 80 percent of  the FDI 
comes from EU countries.78 The top three inves-
tors on a multiannual basis are Germany, Austria, 
and the Netherlands, with a total share of  24.85 
percent, 11.54 percent, and 12.13 percent, res-
pectively, in 2012. These are followed by Luxem-
bourg79 (which in 2012 was even in second place, 
with 13.59 percent, but always among the first four 
ranking investors), France (4.3 percent), Switzer-
land (3.7 percent), and the United Kingdom (3.6 
percent). Chinese FDI was only 65.4 million euros 
(0.0008 percent of  the total), which lags far behind 
the financial flow from Poland and Romania. The 
values related to Russia were negative in both 2011 
and 2012 (-70.2 and -96.4 million euros), meaning 
that Russian investors disinvested slightly more 
capital during these years from Hungary than they 
invested there. This was a surprising development 
when compared to the Russian investment values 
of  1,128 and 1,516 million euros in 2009 and 2010. 
The role of  the USA’s FDI (1.913 billion euros in 
2012) is important but moderate.
Switching from economic partnership networks to 
the political ones, and security issues in particular, 
Hungarian foreign policy strategy still identifies 
NATO and the US as the most important pillars 
of  conventional regional security in East Central 
Europe. It has set itself  the aim of  counteracting 
Europe’s devaluation in American security and 
foreign politics and contributing to at least maintai-
ning the level of  US commitments in Europe.
As has been seen, Germany is the top economic 
and an important bilateral political partner for 
Hungary, not least because of  the country’s influ-
ence on European integration. Without exami-
ning the V4 and those partnership networks that 
have partial importance in a concrete policy field 
(friends of  cohesion, Russia concerning energy sup-
ply, France and Romania related to the CAP, etc.) 
too closely in the next paragraphs, I would like to 
concentrate on the current government’s “Global 
Opening” or “Eastern Opening” policy. Hungary’s 
goal of  being more actively present on the global 
emerging markets was first adopted by the Foreign 
Relations Strategy in 2008 but was given a high 
political topicality by the Orbán government in 
recent years. The “Eastern Opening” became part 
of  the political discourse of  the “economic fight 
for independence,” mostly with the intention of  
finding alternative investment sources for the Hun-
garian economy to make up for western multinati-
onal companies leaving the country. The economic 
project was covered by a high-level symbolic politi-
cal opening up to countries like China, Azerbaijan, 
and Russia. However, based on the analysis of  the 
statistical background, it can be clearly seen that 
the “Eastern Opening” in the truest sense of  the 
word has not taken place – or has at least not had 
a significant economic effect to date. In any case, 
according to the trade volume and FDI structure 
of  Hungary, these countries constitute a comple-
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mentary but not an alternative partnership network 
for the country compared to its above-mentioned 
traditional economic partners. Even though there 
is undoubtedly significant growth potential in 
these relations, this could not be realized in trade 
or investment relations. Hungary’s trade volume 
increased far less intensively with regard to emer-
ging markets than happened in the case of  other 
European economies without a similar political 
project and symbolic backup. The only dimension 
of  “Eastern Opening” that cannot be disclosed 
is what role these countries have been playing in 
financing Hungarian state debt through the buying 
of  governmental bonds. If  they are indeed backing 
up Hungarian state debt, is this for investment pur-
poses or with political intentions in mind?
Conclusion
Even though Hungary clearly lost its economic 
position against regional competitors over the last 
twelve years, and even though its current political 
development is more than questionable, it is still 
not a simple matter to draw the balance of  these 
dynamics. Reflecting on the title of  this paper: 
will Hungary again become a front-runner in the 
European development process or will it remain a 
partially isolated back-marker? The answer hinges 
mainly on the direction taken in broader European 
development. As far as the question “Quo vadis, 
Hungary?” is concerned, the country is currently 
establishing an alternative political model within 
European integration. Whether this develop-
ment conforms with basic European standards 
and represents a renaissance of  the “Europe of  
Nations” concept, or whether it steps over these 
common rules and goes in the direction of  a 
political and economic “third way” model, is still 
not clear and can only be answered in the future. 
If  one focuses on Hungarian foreign policy, the 
option of  a “Europe of  Nations” is more likely; 
if  one focuses on internal developments, then the 
“third way” model seems more likely. If  more mem-
ber states were to follow this path and Hungary 
became a European front-runner, then this future 
European development can only be interpreted as 
an antithesis of  the current one. If  both Europe 
and Hungary keep to their current lines, it can only 
mean increased isolation for Hungary. However, 
it is a fact that the country’s European policy and 
the attitudes of  the Hungarian elites regarding the 
European Union have since 2010 definitely turned 
in a very pragmatic direction, compared to the 
“EUphoric” phase of  former years. Hungary seems 
to accept the fact of  a “multi-speed integration” 
and takes different pragmatic positions on very dif-
ferent policy issues (like the deepening of  the inte-
gration, the EMU, energy and climate policy, etc.), 
taking into consideration first and foremost an ad 
hoc interpretation of  national interest rather than a 
comprehensive integration strategy.
Daniel Hegedűs is Associate Fellow at the Center 
for Central and Eastern Europe of the Robert 
Bosch Stiftung at the German Council on Foreign 
Relations (DGAP) and a Visiting Lecturer at 
the Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd 
University Budapest.




























Real GDP growth rate of the Visegrad countries 1996–2013
GDP pro capita in current prices (PPS/in euros)



























Government gross debt in GDP percentage
DGAPanalyse 7 | May 2014
27
1 Georgi Gotev, ”EU Parliament Places Hungary under 
Scrutiny”, EurActiv, February 17, 2012, <http://www.
euractiv.com/central-europe/eu-parliament-places-hun-
gary-scr-news-510938> and Speech by Guy Verhofstadt, 




council-40916/> (accessed May 7, 2014).
2 Speech by Viktor Orbán in Dísz Square on May 7, 2002.
3 The so-called “Száz napos program” (Hundred Days 
Program).
4 See the appendix comprehensive V4 charts, detailing GDP 
growth rate, GDP pro capita, government deficit, govern-
ment gross debt, and employment.
5 Speech by Ferenc Gyurcsány in Balatonöszöd on May 26, 
2006. In this leaked speech given to an inner circle of  the 
Hungarian Socialist Party, the prime minister confessed 
that he had repeatedly lied in the party’s election campaign, 
something which led to a deep moral and political crisis 
in the country and mass protests demanding the prime 
minister’s resignation.
6 Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stöver, eds, Elections in Europe: 
A Data Handbook (Baden-Baden, 2010), p. 899.
7 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Gover-
nance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candi-
date Countries of  Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of  
European Public Policy 11:4 (August 2004).
8 The original source of  the three priority pillars of  Hunga-
rian foreign policy is unknown, but it is popularly attribu-
ted to József  Antall, the first democratically elected prime 
minister of  Hungary, who held office from 1990 until his 
death in 1993. The three pillars were: (1) Euro-Atlantic 
Integration; (2) good neighborhood relations; and (3) the 
protection of  Hungarians living abroad.
9 For more on this question, see section 2.1.
10 Source: Eurostat and Eurobarometer.
11 Eurobarometer Survey, <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opi-
nion/cf/showchart_line.cfm?keyID=5&nationID=22,
&startdate=2004.10&enddate=2011.05#fcExportDiv> 
(accessed May 7, 2014).
12 Government of  Hungary, External Relations Strategy, 
2008.
13 See the comparison of  real GDP growth rates in the 
appendix.
14 See the appendix for comprehensive V4 charts of  nominal 
GDP, GDP pro capita, government deficit, government 
gross debt, and employment.
15 These steps were later recognized as positive contributions 
to the crisis management by György Matolcsy, the first 
economic minister of  the second Orbán government.
16 This redistribution of  debt to taxpayers is highly questi-
onable in terms of  social justice, as the accrual of  debt 
in foreign currency was an attractive and logical financial 
alternative during the first decade of  the millennium as a 
consequence of  the Hungarian Central Bank’s high inte-
rest rate policy.
17 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
18 Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the occasion 
of  the opening of  the new Mercedes-Benz plant in Kecs-










Employment rate (ages 15 to 64)
Notes
DGAPanalyse 7 | May 2014
28
19 Source: DG Regio.
20 If  the symbolic conservative turn of  the education policy 
is not taken into consideration.
21 Creating exactly the opposite of  the mobility scheme of  
Poland and Romania.
22 Source: Tárki.
23 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
24 All sources: Eurostat.
25 For high quality and deep analysis, see for example the 
work of  legal scholar Kim Lane Scheppele.
26 Act Nr. 2010/CLXXXV on media services and mass 
communication.
27 For the position of  Dunja Mijatovic, OSCE Representative 
on Freedom of  the Media about the Hungarian Media Law, 
see: “Hungarian media law further endangers media free-
dom, says OSCE media freedom representative”, OSCE 
Newsroom, December 21, 2010, <http://www.osce.org/
fom/74687> (accessed May 7, 2014).
28 Jonethan Marcus, “Hungary: Media law row overshadows 
EU presidency”, BBC News Europe, January 7, 2011, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12140395> 
(accessed May 7, 2014).
29 These were the question of  “balanced information,” the 
rules of  media authorization and registration, the provi-
sions concerning “media content causing offence,” and 
finally the breaching of  the EU media legislation principle 
“country of  origin.” See: “Commission Vice-President 
Kroes welcomes amendments to Hungarian media law”, 
European Commission – MEMO/11/89, February 16, 
2011, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-
89_en.htm> (accessed May 7, 2014).
30 Revised Hungarian media legislation continuous to severely 
limit media pluralism, says OSCE media freedom repre-
sentative”, OSCE Newsroom, May 25, 2012, <http://
www.osce.org/fom/90823> (accessed May 7, 2014).
31 For the resolution of  the European Parliament after 
the amendment of  the Hungarian media law, see “P7_
TA(2011)0094 – European Parliament resolution of  10 
March 2011 on media law in Hungary”, <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0094+0+DOC+XML+V0//
EN> (accessed May 7, 2014).
32 “CDL-AD(2012)03-e – Opinion on Act CXII of  
2011 on informational Self-determination and Free-




33 See note 1.
34 The European Commission stated that “it has doubts on 
the rules of  dismissal for the Governor and the members 
of  the Monetary Council which are prone to political 
interference (even the Parliament can propose to dismiss 
a member of  the Monetary Council) and possible misuse. 
Also the frequent changes of  the institutional framework 
of  the MNB raise doubts, for instance via the increase 
in the number of  Monetary Council members together 
with the possibility of  increasing the number of  deputy 
governors without due consideration of  the MNB’s needs. 
Moreover, a constitutional provision regulates the possible 
merger of  the MNB with the financial supervisory autho-
rity. While the merger is not a problem as such, the MNB 
Governor would become a simple deputy chairman of  the 
new structure, which would structurally encroach on his 
independence.”
35 The European Commission stated that the creation of  
“a new National Agency for Data Protection, replacing 
the current Data Protection Commissioner’s Office as 
of  January 1, 2012. As a result, the six-year term of  the 
Data Protection Commissioner currently in office, who 
was appointed in 2008, will be prematurely put to an end. 
There are no interim measures until the term of  the cur-
rent Commissioner’s term ends in 2014.The new rules also 
create the possibility that the prime minister and president 
could dismiss the new supervisor on arbitrary grounds.”
36 “Court of  Justices rules forced early retirement of  judges 
incompatible with EU law”, European Commission – 
MEMO/12/832, November 6, 2012, <http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-832_en.htm> (accessed 
May 7, 2014).
37 “P7_TA(2013)0315 – European Parliament report on 
the Situation of  Fundamental Rights: Standards and 
Practices in Hungary”, June 15, 2013, <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0229+0+DOC+XML+V0//
EN> (accessed May 7, 2014).
38 Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Hungary, Hungary’s For-
eign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of  the Council 
of  the European Union (2011).
39 Ibid., p. 4
40 The quotations are drawn from an Orbán speech delivered 
in Madrid on November 17, 2012.
41 The Hungarian External Relations Strategy of  2008 
emphasized the importance of  (1) universal values com-
monly shared by EU and NATO partners; (2) the interna-
tional and global solidarity mainly in the frame of  interna-
tional development programs; and (3) competitiveness and 
sustainable growth.
42 The main priorities of  the External Relations Strategy 
2008 were the following points, in the following order: 
(1) a competitive Hungary in the European Union; (2) 
successful Hungarians in the region; and (3) a responsible 
Hungary in the world.
43 Orbán stated, among other things: “The political and 
intellectual program of  1848 proclaimed: we will not be 
a colony! The program and the desire of  Hungarians in 
2012 is: we will not be a colony! Hungary could not have 
DGAPanalyse 7 | May 2014
29
stood against the pressure and dictats from abroad in the 
winter of  2011-2012 if  it were not for those hundreds 
of  thousands of  people who stood up to show everyone 
that Hungarians will not live as foreigners dictate, will not 
give up their independence or their freedom, therefore 
they will not give up their constitution either, which they 
finally managed to draft after twenty years. Thank you 
all!” Orbán also declared: “We are more than familiar with 
the character of  unsolicited comradely assistance, even if  
it comes wearing a finely tailored suit and not a uniform 
with shoulder patches.” For the entire speech see: “Vik-
tor Orbán’s Speech, Budapest, 15.03.2012” available at: 
<http://orbanspeech.pen.io/> (accessed May 7, 2014).
44 Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency 
of  the Council of  the European Union.
45 Róbert Kiss Szemán, “Homo Visegradicus,” in The Vise-
grad Group: A Central European Constellation, ed. A. 
Jagodziński (Bratislava: International Visegrad Fund, 2006).
46 The Beneś decrees, issued between 1940 and 1945 by the 
Czechoslovakian government-in-exile during German 
occupation, provided a legal basis for the ethnic German 
and Hungarian minorities’ postwar deprivation of  rights 
and for their eviction from Czechoslovakian territory. For 
more, read Thum, Gregor, »Ethnic Cleansing in Eastern 
Europe after 1945« in Contemporary European History 19 
(1) (2006–2007), pp. 75–81.
47 Poland (27), Czech Republic (12), Hungary (12), and Slova-
kia (7) vs. Germany (29) and France (29).
48 Source: Eurostat.
49 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
50 The average of  Sweden, Ireland, and Slovenia.
51 Convergence Report 2012. Price stability criteria is formu-
lated that the twelve-month HCIP average of  the country 
cannot be more than 1.5 percentage points above the rate 
of  the three best performing member states.
52 Source: Convergence Report 2012, Eurostat.
53 In recent years Greece and Portugal have frequently been 
cited as benchmark countries, often having had low infla-
tion figures as a consequence of  their economic recession.
54 Basic Law of  Hungary, Article K.
55 Kristián Takáč et al., “Once in a Lifetime: Opportunities 
for Visegrad in EU Energy Infrastructure Plans,” Central 
European Policy Institute (2013).
56 Annual reports of  the Hungarian Energy and Public Uti-
lity Regulatory Authority are available on the following 
link: <http://www.mekh.hu/adatok-statisztikak-2/kiad-
vanyok/tajekoztato-kiadvany.html>. See also the European 
Commission report:  Energy Markets in the European 
Union in 2011 (Publications Office of  the European 
Union, Luxembourg, 2012). Available at: <http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/20121217_
energy_market_2011_lr_en.pdf> (accessed May 7, 2014).
57 The source of  this and following figures is: Energy Poli-
cies of  IEA Countries: Hungary 2011 Review.
58 For concrete projects and PCI clusters, see <http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/pci/pci_en.htm> 
(accessed May 7, 2014).
59 National Energy Security 2030, p. 24.
60 For the actual list of  PCIs visit <http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/infrastructure/pci/pci_en.htm> (accessed May 7, 
2014).
61 Article 37 (3) of  the Hungarian Basic Law.
62 The source of  this and following figures is HEA Report 
on renewable electricity production. <http://www.mekh.
hu/en/publications/presentations-studies.html> (accessed 
May 7, 2014).
63 The Europe 2020 target indicator.
64 In the current situation, when allowance prices are low, the 
“investment for free allowance” strategy can have a much 
more negative financial balance than if  it is paid for by the 
allowances.
65 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “When Europe 
Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change” in 
European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 4:15 (2000). 
Available at: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-015.pdf> 
(accessed May 7, 2014).
66 Report on the implementation of  the national deve-
lopment plan, State Audit Office of  Hungary (2011). 
Available at: <http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/1110/
jelentes-a-nemzeti-fejlesztesi-terv-vegrehajtasanak-
ellenorzeserol/1110j000.pdf> (accessed May 7, 2014).
67 Source: DG Regio.
68 6 § (3) of  the former Hungarian Constitution (Act Nr. 
1949/XX.) and Article D) of  the Basic Law.
69 Regarding this question, see Patrick Thornberry and Maria 
Amor Estebanez, Minority Rights in Europe (Strasbourg: 
Council of  Europe Publishing, 2004).
70 Slovakia, for example, still does not have a comprehensive 
minority law, a legal obligation for the country resulting 
from its accession to the Council of  Europe in 1993.
71 To the phenomenon, and generally to the development of  
minority protection at EU level, see Gabriel Toggenburg, 
“A Rough Orientation Through a Delicate Relationship: 
The European Union’s Endeavours for its Minorities,” 
EIoP 4:16 (2000); Gabriel N. Toggenburg, ed., Minority 
Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way 
Forward (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2004).
72 That time Art. 6 TEU.
73 The strategy was originally initiated in 2008 by the joint let-
ter of  the Austrian Chancellor Gusenbauer and the Roma-
nian Prime Minister Tariceanu to the president of  the 
European Commission. See: “EU Strategy for the Danube 
Region - Factsheet”. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/
DGAPanalyse 7 | May 2014
30
regional_policy/cooperate/danube/pdf/at_eusdr_coun-
try_fiche_en.pdf> (accessed May 7, 2014).
74 See European Roma Policy Coalition, Towards a European 
Policy on Roma Inclusion: EU Roma Policy Coalition 
(2010); Márton Rövid, “‘One-Size-Fits-All-Roma?’ On the 
Normative Dilemmas of  the Emerging European Roma 
Policy,” HIIA Papers T-2009/9 (Hungarian Institute of  
International Affairs).
75 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, with the 
author’s own calculations.
76 With 196.8 million euro deficit in relation to Austria and 
877.5 million euro surplus in relation to Italy.
77 From this merge, Slovakia was responsible for 5.1 percent, 
together with 722-million euro trade surplus for Hungary; 
Poland for 4.3 percent and 365 million-euro deficit, and 
last but not least, the Czech Republic, for 3.4 percent and 
a 626 million-euro surplus.
78 Source: Hungarian Central Bank Statistics.
79 FDI inflows from the Netherlands and Luxembourg repre-
sent mainly multinational companies having the European 
headquarters in these countries as consequence of  their 
national tax regulations. 
DGAPanalyse 7 | May 2014
31
DGAPanalyse 7 | May 2014
32

Herausgeber: Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Direktor des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V. | 
Rauchstraße 17/18 | 10787 Berlin | Tel.: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-0 | Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16 | info@dgap.org | www.dgap.org |  
ISSN 1611-7034 | © 2014 DGAP
